Abstract. D. Davies and S. Murphy found that there are at most 660 different probability distributions on the output from any three adjacent S-boxes after 16 rounds of DES [5] . In this paper it is shown that there are only 72 different distributions for S-boxes 4, 5 and 6. The distributions from S-box triplets are linearly dependent and the dependencies are described. E.g. there are only 13 linearly independent distributions for S-boxes 4, 5 and 6. A coset representation of DES S-boxes which reveals their hidden linearity is studied. That may be used in algebraic attacks. S-box 4 can be represented by significantly fewer cosets than the other S-boxes and therefore has more linearity. Open cryptanalytic problems are stated.
Introduction
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a symmetric block cipher from 1977. It has block size of 64 bits and a 56-bit key. DES in its original form is deprecated due to the short key. Triple DES [1] however, is still used in many applications (e.g. in chip-based payment cards). It is therefore still important to analyze its security. DES is probably the most analyzed cipher, and is broken by linear [8] and differential [3] cryptanalysis. Even so, the most effective method in practice is still exhaustive search for the key. There are also some algebraic attacks that can break 6-round DES [4] . Donald Davies and Sean Murphy described in [5] some statistical properties of the S-boxes in DES. They found that there are at most 660 different distributions on the output from any three adjacent S-boxes after 16 rounds. These distributions divide the key space into classes where equivalent keys make the output follow the same distributions. The correct class is found by identifying which distribution a set of plaintext/ciphertext pairs follow. They used this to give a known-plaintext attack. The time complexity of the attack is about the same as brute-force attack and requires approximately 2 56.6 plaintext/ciphertext pairs. The attack was improved by Biham and Biryukov [2] where the key can be found with 2 50 plaintext/ciphertext pairs with 2 50 operations. Later, KunzJacques and Muller [7] further improved the attack to a chosen-plaintext attack with time complexity 2 45 using 2 45 chosen plaintexts. In this paper we study new statistical and algebraic properties of DES. In Section 2 we show Davies and Murphy's results, using different notations than theirs. We also show a new exceptional property of S 4 , and use this to show that there are fewer different distributions on the output from S 4 S 5 S 6 compared to other triplets. The new properties are related to the forth S-box in DES, and is used to show that the number of different distributions on the output from S-box 4, 5 and 6 is at most 72 (after 16 rounds). This divides the key space into fewer, but larger, classes compared to Davies and Murphy's results.
The distributions from S-box triplets are linearly dependent. We give a description of the relations between the distributions, and upper bound the number of linearly independent distributions for each triplet. E.g. among the 72 different distributions for S-box 4, 5 and 6 there are only 13 linearly independent.
A coset representation of the DES S-boxes is suggested in Section 4. It is found that S-box 4 is abnormal again. It can be covered by 10 sub-cosets while the other S-boxes require at least 16. Also, the coset representation of S-box 4 contains 6 sub-cosets of size 8, while the other S-boxes contain at most one sub-coset of such size. The coset representation of S-boxes makes it possible to write the system of equations for DES in a more compact form than in [9, 10] .
Like the linear approximations discovered by Shamir [12] was later used by Matsui [8] to successfully break DES, these new properties might improve some attacks in the future. Two open problems are stated at the end of the paper. If solved that would improve statistical and algebraic attacks on DES.
Notations
Let X i−1 , X i denote the input to the i-th round and X i , X i+1 denote the ith round output. So X 0 , X 1 and X 17 , X 16 are plaintext and ciphertext blocks respectively, where the initial and final permutations are ignored. Let K i be the 48-bit round key at round i. Then
whereX i is a 48-bit expansion of X i , P denotes a permutation on 32 symbols, and S is a transform implemented by 8 S-boxes. Let S j be a DES S-box, so
where u i and v i are input and output bits respectively.
Results from Davies and Murphy
By (1), the XOR of the plaintext/ciphertext blocks are representable as follows
In this section we study the joint distribution of bits in X 17 ⊕ X 1 and in X 16 ⊕ X 0 which come from the output of 3 adjacent S-boxes in DES round function, and therefore in Y i . These results are from [5] , but presented using a different notation.
Definitions and a Basic Lemma
The output of 3 adjacent S-boxes is called (S i−1 , S i , S i+1 )-output when i is specified. When analysing (3) and (4) we assume the round function inputs X 2 , X 4 , . . . , X 16 and X 1 , X 3 , . . . , X 15 are uniformly random and independent respectively. Input to S i is accordingly assumed to be uniformly random. These common assumptions were already in [5] .
When we look at a reduced number of rounds in DES (k rounds), then X k+1 ⊕X 1 and X k ⊕X 0 follows the distribution for the XOR of k/2 round-outputs (for even k). We will throughout this paper use 2n to denote the number of rounds. n is the number of outputs that are XORed, and full DES is represented by n = 8.
We define three distributions that are related to each S i . We use notation (2).
bution and we denote p Obviously, p
x,y,r and q
x,y,r , the sums are over 2-bit x, y respectively. Lemma 1. For any 2-bit x, y and any 4-bit r holds
Proof. The equalities (5) and (6) were found directly from the values of p
x,r , for instance, see those distributions listed for S 4 in Appendix 1. Alternatively, by DES S-box definition, for any fixed (u 5 , u 0 ) the distribution of (v 3 , v 2 , v 1 , v 0 ) is uniform. So (u 0 , v 3 , v 2 , v 1 , v 0 ) and (u 5 , v 3 , v 2 , v 1 , v 0 ) are uniformly distributed and that implies (5) and (6) as A. Kholosha [6] later observed. The former implies (7) as well.
Output-Distributions on S-box Triplets
We study the distribution of the output from three adjacent S-boxes in DES round function. Let (a 5 , ..., a 0 ), (b 5 , ..., b 0 ) and (c 5 , ..., c 0 ) be the input to three adjacent S-boxes in one DES round. Then
where k and k , the common key bits, are both 2-bit linear combinations of round-key-bits. By k j = (k j1 , k j0 ) and k j = (k j1 , k j0 ) we denote the common key bits in round j. Let (r, s, t) be a 12-bit output from S i−1 , S i , S i+1 in one DES round. Then
The distribution of (r, s, t) after 2n rounds is the n-fold convolution of (8):
where the sum is over (r i , s i , t i ) such that i (r i , s i , t i ) = (r, s, t). By changing the order of summation and using (8) we get
where the sum is over 2-bit x 1 , y 1 , ..., x n , y n , and
xn,yn,sn .
Lemma 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any 2-bit x 1 , y 1 ..., x n , y n and 4-bit r, t
, where k and k are the parity of (k 11 , ..., k n1 ) and (k 10 , ..., k n0 ).
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Each value for the vector (k 1 , k 1 , ..., k n , k n ) can be mapped to a distribution on (r, s, t). Many of these distributions are equal to each other. Corollary 1 is now used to give an upper bound on the number of different distributions.
First, one can permute any (k j , k j ) and (k i , k i ) and get the same distribution. Also the distribution is defined by the parity of (k 11 , ..., k n1 ) and (k 10 , ..., k n0 ). There are 4 values for the two parity-bits, and there are 3+n n combinations for the remaining 2n bits (k 10 , ..., k n0 ) and (k 11 , ..., k n1 ). Therefore there are at most 4 × 3+n n different distributions on the output from three adjacent Sboxes. Table 1 lists the maximum number of different distributions after multiple rounds. Again, 16-round DES is specified by n=8. for any 2-bit x and 4-bit h. It is easy to see the lemma is true for a = 2. All other cases are reduced to a = 1 and
From S 4 right hand side distribution values, see Table 5 in Appendix 1, we find
and then
for any 2-bit x = (x 1 , x 0 ) and any 4-bit r. Hence
The lemma is proved.
This surprising property holds because (10), (11), (12) are true simultaneously for the right hand side distribution p (4) x,h . Corollary 2. For any 2-bit x 1 , ..., x n and 4-bit r holds
for any x 1 , x 2 , k 1 , k 2 and r. Therefore the corollary is true for n = 2. The general case follows recursively.
The Number of Different Output-Distributions.
Davies and Murphy found that there are at most 4× 3+n n different distributions of the output from 3 adjacent S-boxes after 2n rounds. In this section we show (S 4 , S 5 , S 6 )-output has at most (8n + 8) different distributions.
Lemma 3. Let (r, s, t) be (S 4 , S 5 , S 6 )-output after 2n rounds. There are at most 8n + 8 different distributions (r, s, t) can follow.
Proof. By Corollary 1 and 2 the distribution of (r, s, t) only depends on n j=1 k j , n j=1 k j0 and common key bits (k 11 , ..., k n1 ), where the order of the last n bits is irrelevant. There are n + 1 combinations for (k 11 , ..., k n1 ) and 8 possible values for the three parity bits. The maximum number of different distributions is therefore at most 8n + 8 as the lemma states.
We computed the actual number of different distributions for all 8 triplets. Table  2 lists the results for n = 1, ..., 8 together with the bound from Lemma 3 and Davies-Murphy's bound. Remark that 16-round DES is specified by n = 8.
It is not clear whether or not fewer different distribution can improve DaviesMurphy's attack. Intuitively, distinguishing between few distributions could be easier than distinguishing between many distributions (if the biases are approximately the same). At the same time, the number of keys in the class representing a given distribution is larger, so more work is required to identify the correct key in the class. Also, the triplet attack described by Davies and Murphy does not perform better than the attack based on the two S-box pairs in the triplet [5] . We do not know if it is possible to alter Davies-Murphy's attack so that fewer distribution would give an advantage.
Linear Dependencies Between the Distributions
In this section we describe linear relations between distributions on the output from three adjacent S-boxes. We will see how (S 4 , S 5 , S 6 ) compares to the other triplets. A distribution can be represented by a row-vector (v 0 , ..., v 2 12 −1 ), where v j is the probability of the output j = (r, s, t). Let M be a matrix whose rows are (S i−1 , S i , S i+1 )-output distributions. M is then called a distribution matrix. A non-zero vector r such that rM = 0 is called a linear relation for M . Let R be a matrix whose rows are linear relations for M , then R is called a relation matrix for M . Then
where k is the number of rows in M . There are five independent linear relations inside the right, LR and left distribution that can be used to find linear relation between the rows of M . By Lemma 1,
x⊕a,r = 0 and
where 
x,y,r + Q 
One now subtracts (15) and (15) after changing y ← y ⊕ 1, (16) and (16) after changing x ← x ⊕ 2, then (17) and (17) after changing y ← y ⊕ 1. So
for any x, y and r, where C is any of 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 Both (14) and (18) are used to build linear relations between the distributions of (r, s, t), the output from three adjacent S-boxes after one round.
Lemma 4.
For any k
Proof. We will prove (19):
Similarly (20) is proved. We will prove (21).
Lemma 4 implies there are 11 linear dependencies between rows of the distribution matrix after one round. The rank of the relation matrix is 10. We have also computed the rank of the distribution matrix which is 6. Since there are 16 distributions in total, we have found all 10 independent linear relations between the distributions. Lemma 4 is now used to build linear relations between the distributions after 2n rounds.
where
Proof. It is enough to prove (22) for i = 1.
where is over all (r j , s j , t j ) such that j (r j , s j , t j ) = (r, s, t). The proofs of (23) and (24) are similar.
Generating all relations from (22), (23) and (24) for all values of (k 1 , ..., k n ), (k 1 , ..., k n ), and i will make a relation matrix too large to calculate the rank when n ≥ 4. We will instead consider a distribution matrix M , where each distribution occurs only once. We then generate a relation matrix for M . This way, by using (13), we find an upper bound on the rank of M for all triplets and n ≤ 8, see row 2 and 3 in Table 3 . Triplet S 4 S 5 S 6 have an upper bound on the rank which is lower than the other triplets. Full DES is specified by n = 8. We also computed the actual rank of M for each triplet, see row 4-11. Each distribution is determined by a class of DES keys. Table 3 data suggests a strong statistical dependence between ciphertexts generated with representatives of such classes. An open problem is stated in the end of this paper, which if solved, could make use of these statistical dependencies to improve the probability of success on Davies-Murphy's attack.
S-box Coset Representation and DES Equations
For each S i by (2) a set T i of 10-bit strings
is defined. They are vectors in a vector space of dimension 10 over field with two elements F 2 denoted F may be partitioned into a union of its sub-cosets. We try to partition into sub-cosets of largest possible dimension, in other words of largest size. Denote the set of such cosets by U , it is constructed by the following algorithm. One first constructs a list of all sub-cosets in T maximal by inclusion. Let C be a maximal in dimension coset from the list, then C is added to U and the Algorithm recursively applies to T \ C. Let
Therefore x ∈ T if and only if x is a solution to the system xA k = b k associated with C k ∈ U .
The algorithm was applied to the vector sets T i defined by DES S-boxes S i . Let the sets of cosets U i be produced. The results are summarised in Table 4 
More Compact DES Equations
Given one plaintext/ciphertext pair one constructs a system of equations in the key bits by introducing new variables after each S-box application, 128 equations for 16-round DES. By specifying S i ,
with 64 right hand sides, 10-bit vectors T i written column-wise. HereX ji and K ji are 6-bit sub-blocks ofX j and K j respectively. To find the key such equations are solved. That may be done with methods introduced in [10] , see also [9] . The complexity heavily depends on the number of right hand sides. We get a more compact representation, that is with lower number of sides. We use the previous section notation. Let U i contain r cosets. So x ∈ T i if and only if x is a solution to exactly one of the linear equation systems
We cover the set of right hand side columns in (26) with sub-cosets from U i and get (26) is equivalent to
in sense that an assignment to the variables is a solution to (26) if and only if it is a solution to one of (27). The number of subsystems(also called sides) in (27), denoted by r, is between 10 and 19 depending on the S-box. For instance, in case of S 4 the equation (27) has only 10 subsystems, while (26) has 64. Such reduction generally allows a faster solution, see [11] .
Conclusion and Open Problems
In the present paper new statistical and algebraic properties of the DES encryption were found. They may have cryptanalytic implications upon resolving the following theoretical questions. The first problem is within the statistical cryptanalysis. Let the cipher key space be split into n classes K 1 , . . . , K n . Each class defines a multinomial distribution on some ≥ 2 outcomes, defined by plaintext and ciphertext bits. Let P 1 , . . . , P n be all such distributions computed a priori. Let ν(k) denote a vector of observations on above outcomes for an unknown cipher key k. It is well known that the problem "decide k ∈ K i " may be solved with maximum likelihood method as in [5] . For the classification of several observation vectors ν(k 1 ), . . . , ν(k s ) the same method is applied.
Open problem is to improve the method (reduce error probabilities) given the vectors P 1 , . . . , P n are linearly dependent. That would improve Davies-Murphy type attacks against 16-round DES as for 660 different distributions (72 for (S 4 , S 5 , S 6 )) only ≤ 48 (13 for (S 4 , S 5 , S 6 )) are linearly independent.
The second problem is related to algebraic attacks against ciphers. A new type time-memory trade-off for AES and DES was observed in [9, 10] . Let m be the cipher key size. Let ≤ 2 l right hand sides be allowed in the combinations by Gluing of the MRHS equations [9, 10] during solution. Gluing means writing several equations as one equation of the same type as (26). Then guessing ≤ m − l key-bits is enough before the system of equations is solved by finding and removing contradictory right-hand sides in pairwise agreeing of the current equations. The overall time complexity is at least 2 m−l × 2 l = 2 m operations as for each guess one needs to run over the right hand sides of at least one of the equations. However coset representation allows reducing the number of sides by writing them as (27). In case of DES the equation (26) for i = 4 is written with only 10 sides instead of 64. For AES instead of 256 right hand sides one can do 64 for each of the equations, see [11] . The combination of two equations (26) with Gluing has ≤ 2 12 right hand sides. With coset representation the number of sides is at most 19 2 (at most 100 for the combination of two equations from S 4 ). Open problem is to reduce the time complexity of the above trade-off by using coset representation. Table 6 . Left hand side distribution of S-box 4 (each entry = 2 6 × q
x,r ) 1 1 0 2 1 Table 7 . LR distribution of S-box 4 (each entry = 2 6 × Q 
